Lanchow, the Peiping regime's only military nuclear base, has attracted world attention as a result of the three atomic tests in Sinkiang province. Located in the heartland of China and guarding the door to the northwest, Lanchow has been an important city in Chinese history. It became the capital of Kansu province early in the Manchu dynasty. In 1953, the Chinese Communists enlarged the city by incorporating adjacent villages. The area was increased from 169 to 400 square kilometers. Population soared from 190,000 in 1949 to the present 1,290,000.
Lanchow has about 360 industrial plants. Products include power, textiles, flour, chemicals, oil, machinery, paper, iron and steel, minerals, and cement. The city is the center of a rail and highway network linking Sinkiang with southeastern China. Air service connects Lanchow with Peiping and Shanghai.
Lanchow's institutions of higher education have increased in the last 17 years from 3 to 15, middle schools from 15 to 50, primary schools from 67 to 265. There are 25 scientific research institutes.
Economically, Lanchow is a market center for Kansu, Ninghsia, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang provinces. The petroleum, wool, and herb medicines produced in northwestern China move through the city. Products of eastern and southeastern China moving to northwestern China funnel through Lanchow. With low-priced raw materials from northwestern China and the Yellow River to provide power resources, Lanchow has great industrial potential.
In May, 1957, the Communist "Chinese Academy of Sciences" met in Peiping and decided to establish the "Northwestern Scientific Research Center" in Lanchow. The others are at Peiping and Shanghai.
(File photo)
Since 1957 a succession of nuclear research institutes has been established in Lanchow. The primary objective is the application of nuclear techniques and not the pursuit of theoretical research. So far no theoretical achievements are credited to Lanchow, although this does not rule out such a possibility in the future.
The Chinese Communists have assigned a large team of scientists to the Lanchow center. Geologists of the third bureau of the "ministry of geology" supervise prospecting for uranium. They include Huang Ti-pan and Yang Shih-cho. Nuclear scientists include Wang Kan-chang, Peng Huang-wu, Chou Chung-chih, Shen Kuang-chun, Hsieh Hsiu-chun, Wu Hsin-neng, Chou Nan, Liu Ching-kan, Huang Huan-kun, Wang Chu-hsiang, and Kung Yu-chang. Many of the top chemists of the mainland are at Lanchow, including Kao Yun-lung, Sun Mien, Yuan Cheng-yun, Hu Tse-teh, Liu Cheng-li, Liu Yu-cheng, Jen Shuan-chih, Chao Chi-yu, Ku Hong-sheng, Tso Chung-chi, Li Hu-lin, Sun Chien-ching, Chang Kuang, Su Lien-yao, Yi Jui-tu, Shao Miao-cheng, Huang Wen-hui, Chang Cheng-chieh, Huang Tien-chun, Tseng Hua-hsien, and Wang Chang-sheng. The city has been the site of important scientific conferences.
According to Chinese Communist geologists, most of the rare metals in China are found in Tsinghai province near the Kansu border. Uranium reserves are estimated at 600 tons.
The distribution of nuclear-connected mines in the Lanchow area is as follows: (1) Titanium, platinum and chromium mines at Chilienshan (Chilien Mountain) in northwestern Kansu; (2) uranium mines on the upper reaches of the Yellow River, which runs through Lanchow; and (3) uranium mines along the Kansu-Inner Mongolia border.
According to a report entitled "New Gains From A Geological Study In the Chilienshan Area" by the "Chinese Academy of Sciences" on January 9, 1958, the Chilienshan area showed evidences of titanium. The report said the area also had deposits of chromium and platinum. Some Chinese Communist geologists said there are rich reserves of rare metals in areas south of Chilienshan.
Tight Control
In 1956, the third bureau of the Chinese Communist "ministry of geology" began to assume control of the upper reaches of the Yellow River in Tsinghai province, southwest of Lanchow, because an important uranium mine was discovered in that area. This control was denounced by geologist Tu Kuang-chih of the "Chinese Academy of Sciences" as an attempt by the ministry to monopolize prospecting for uranium. Peiping's strict control of uranium has no exception, not even for personnel of the "Chinese Academy of Sciences".
Chinese Communist geologists Ho Cho-lin, Kuo Cheng-chi, Chang Pei-shang, Chung Chi-cheng, Chang Chin, and Li Min-wei found uranium and thorium-bearing areas in northern areas of Kansu and southern areas of Inner Mongolia. Similar ores were found in Manchuria, Hopei, Shansi, and Tibet. However, the reserves in the Lanchow area arc more valuable.
The highest uranic content of uranium on the Chinese mainland comes from ores of the helium yttrium mines in Yenshan (Swallow Mountain): 14.9 per cent. The lowest uranic content is 0.0056 per cent. The average content is 0.0327 per cent.
Ores in areas around Lanchow have uranium content as high as 10.63 per cent. Ores of southern Inner Mongolia have 0.175 per cent of uranium.
Poor Quality Ores
It should be pointed out that ores with a high percentage of uranium were suddenly obtained from an unannounced source by the Chinese Reds at a time when they were putting great stock in ores of poorer uranium content. Scientists made recommendations for the analysis of poor ores after Peiping’s first nuclear test. The implication is that the Chinese mainland has only "poor mines". Peiping's nuclear development therefore is bound to be slow. The exploitation of "poor mines" will be expensive in money and manpower. It does not seem likely that the Chinese Reds can establish adequate nuclear facilities within the next five years. Lanchow can be no more than a "nuclear base" of the Peiping regime.
The Chinese Communists began construction of a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow in 1960 and completed it in the spring of 1963.
This is the only plant producing nuclear fuel for military use. A nuclear base ordinarily must be near the place where the nuclear fuel is produced. Considering the concentration of nuclear research activities and the location of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, that city must be the base for military nucleonics.
Making A-Bombs
In the manufacture of atomic bombs, these steps are involved:
(1) Ores are refined and undergo chemical handling. Then uranium fluoride gas (UF6) is produced and U-235 and U-238 are extracted through diffusion.
(2) The gaseous diffusion plant sends U-235 products on to atomic research institutes for further processing.
(3) The U-238 products go to scientific institutes for conversion into helium 239.
According to conservative estimate, the production capability of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow has been as follows:
(1) Refining of ores: 530 tons in 1963, 730 tons in 1964, and 960 tons in 1965.
(2) Output of U-235 was 5.25 kilograms in 1963, 1964, and 1965 for a total of 15.75 kilograms.
(3) U-238 converted into neptunium 239 and helium 239 was 795 kilograms in
1963, 694 kilograms in 1964, and 745 kilograms in 1965 for a total of 2,234.
In the light of this analysis, it is possible — as foreign newspapers have reported-that the Chinese Communists may have used helium 239 in their first two nuclear tests and more probably in the second one. However, from the technical standpoint, the possibility of this is small.
Because the Lanchow nuclear base was jointly established by the "Chinese Academy of Sciences", industrial agencies, and military research organizations, difficulties about its use have often arisen. To overcome these, the Chinese Reds may adopt a pattern of unitary organization.
Among the 130 research institutes for nuclear development on the Chinese mainland, 28 are controlled by the military.
From 1958 to 1964, the "Chinese Academy of Sciences" spent about 8,280 million JMP (the Chinese Communist monetary unit with official rate of about US$0.40) on the science. About 4,410 million JMP went to nuclear activities. In the same period, the military spent about 5,200 million JMP for the "Military Academy of Sciences" and the "Technical Department of Military Sciences".
Weather Tests
Considering the organizations and facilities of the "Chinese Academy of Sciences" at Lanchow, the money spent on nuclear development there between 1958 and 1964 should not be less than 880 million JMP. The annual average was at least 126 million JMP. The military spent about 1,054 million JMP in the same period, averaging 151 million JMP annually.
These figures do not include expenditures by other government agencies or industrial and educational enterprises. In the five years since start of construction on the Lanchow gaseous diffusion plant, the Chinese Communists spent 1,385 million JMP for nuclear research and development in Lanchow alone.
From May to October, 1959, the Communist "Chinese Academy of Sciences" carried out a series of indoor and outdoor tests in the artificial control of weather. The Academy proclaimed that the tests were designed to solve the drought problem in Northwest China. After 30 aerial and 3 ground tests, the Academy declared it was possible to control the weather in Kansu province.
The Chinese Communists said they were creating low-altitude clouds to end drought in the Lanchow and Chilienshan areas. Actually, if such clouds can be created and controlled, they also can be used to camouflage military installations for protection against air attacks. Thus the weather research appears to be more a matter of safeguarding nuclear installations than of combating drought in a remote province.
New Base Probable
Before the Chinese Communists exploded their first nuclear device, Western countries often underestimated Peiping's nuclear achievements and exaggerated its nuclear potential. Since Peiping's nuclear tests, this view has been reversed. Actually, both views are extreme. In truth the Chinese Communist accomplishments in nuclear science are limited. Although nuclear potential is considerable, it is not nearly as tremendous as imagined in the West. Moreover, because of lack of money and advanced industrial pears to be more a matter of safeguarding nuclear installations loan of combating drought years to come.
There are indications the Chinese Communists will establish another nuclear base near Tsinghai Lake in Tsinghai province. Evidence of this includes these points: (1) Although it is only 200 kilometers from Lanchow to Hsining, the capital of Tsinghai province, air service has been started between these remote cities. (2) The highway linking Hsining and Tibet has been closed by the Reds and traffic from Tsinghai to Tibet is routed through Kansu province. (3) Geographically, the Tsinghai Lake area has strategic advantages over Lanchow. (4) High quality uranium mines have been found in the area. (5) Weather tests may be for the purpose of camouflaging the Tsinghai base.
Stress on Thorium
From 1957 to 1964, the Chinese Communist "ministry of geology", "ministry of metallurgical industry", and other agencies studying rare metals gave special attention to uranium and thorium. However, more emphasis has been given thorium than uranium. Chinese Communist scientists are aware that thorium is less useful than uranium and that no country has used thorium to make nuclear bombs. Then why do they emphasize thorium? If our analysis is correct, the Chinese Communists have already felt the pinch of a uranium shortage and been compelled to turn to thorium. Communist research documents written between 1957 and 1964 indicate more thorium than uranium reserves and suggest that uranium-thorium ores contain more thorium than uranium. The "Geological Research Institute" of the "Chinese Academy of Sciences" found in 1959 that among so-called uranium-thorium ores, the quantity of thorium exceeded uranium by five times. The Institute found many ores containing 50 to 71 per cent of thorium. The shortage of uranium will necessarily restrict Peiping's atomic development. If the long intervals between Peiping's nuclear tests are not due to economic factors, the lack of uranium is the obvious reason for the snail's pace in developing nuclear weaponry. At the most, the Chinese Reds may be able to make three atomic bombs a year. If the Peiping regime cannot solve the technical problems of converting U-238 into plutonium 239 or in using thorium, its development of nuclear weapons will be strictly limited
—translated by Teng Yen-ping